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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Steven D. Benjamin*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past year, the Virginia Court of Appeals continued in
its role as the most significant contributor to criminal case law.
The court ruled on a myriad of issues; the recurring topics involved
arrest and investigatory detention, self-defense, the execution of
search warrants, double jeopardy, the admissibility of eye-witness
identification, and the circumstances and admissibility of a police
interrogation. Also, the court ruled on numerous trial and proce-
dural questions regularly encountered by the circuit courts and
criminal practitioners.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Resisting Arrest
One of the more interesting criminal cases this past year in-
volved a "Rambo-type" confrontation between an off-duty deputy
in Wythe County, Virginia, and Ira Foote, an honorably-discharged
veteran suffering post traumatic stress syndrome from his heavy
combat experience in Vietnam.' The case involved a mountain-side
chase, resulting in nine shots fired by the deputy through his own
windshield. The Virginia Court of Appeals held that one has the
right to resist an unlawful arrest, and is under no duty to retreat
before asserting that right.2
* Sole Practitioner, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1976, East Carolina University; J.D., 1979,
The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. Foote v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 61, 396 S.E.2d 851 (1990).
2. The Court relied upon § 19.2-82 of the Code of Virginia ("Code") to determine the
legality of the warrantless arrest. Foote's arrest was unlawful for two reasons: 1) the deputy
did not display a badge or uniform; and, 2) the radio transmission which prompted the
deputy to make the detention did not contain enough information. The court held that a
mere radio transmission that the driver is wanted is insufficient to establish probable cause
for a warrantless arrest. An officer's good faith in such a situation is of no significance to the
determination. Id. at 65-68, 396 S.E.2d at 854-55 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81 (Curi.
Supp. 1987) (amended 1989)).
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B. Investigatory Detention
In Goodwin v. Commonwealth,3 the defendant was walking from
behind a group of apartments towards the street in a high crime
area when he quickly placed his hand in his pocket after seeing
police officers. The court found that this action did not create a
reasonable suspicion permitting an investigatory detention.4 The
circumstances were sufficiently more suspicious in Dixon v. Com-
monwealth.5 Police officers responded to a dispatch regarding "two
black males and a group of subjects arguing over a drug transac-
tion."6 The officers saw a group of men disburse from the front of
the apartment building and observed several of the men entering
the building. One of the officers entered the building, and saw the
defendant walking down the stairs apparently stuffing a handful of
money into his pocket. The officer stopped the defendant, frisked
him, found a pistol, effected the arrest, and conducted an addi-
tional complete search of the individual. The court held that both
the detention and the frisk were lawful.
An earlier decision by the court of appeals concerning the lawful
parameters of a warrantless search of a detainee's person was re-
versed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Harris v. Common-
wealth.8 In this case, officers investigating suspected drug activity
stopped a car and arrested the driver. During a pat-down of Har-
ris, who was a passenger in the car, an officer felt a film canister in
his pocket. However, when asked by the officer what it contained,
Harris replied "film." When the officer opened it, he found cocaine
and arrested Harris.9
The supreme court discussed the law surrounding stop and frisk
3. 11 Va. App. 363, 398 S.E.2d 690 (1990).
4. Id.; see also Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 363 S.E.2d 708 (1988).
5. 11 Va. App. 554, 399 S.E.2d 831 (1991).
6. Id. at 555, 399 S.E.2d at 832.
7. The reasonableness of the detention was determined by consideration of several fac-
tors: the correlation of the build, age, sex, and race of the defendant with the "suspects"
who had entered the same building; the fact that the officer was involved in a drug investi-
gation; and, the defendant's act of stuffing money into his pocket. Id. at 556, 399 S.E.2d at
832-33.
The pat-down was permissible because of the circumstances of this case, and because "the
suspicion of narcotics possession and distribution gives rise to an inference of dangerous-
ness." Id. at 557, 399 S.E.2d at 833.
8. 241 Va. 146, 400 S.E.2d 191 (1991).
9. Id. at 148, 400 S.E.2d at 192-93.
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encounters. 10 The court held the officer was entitled to frisk Har-
ris, but when his search provided assurances that there were no
weapons, the search should have ceased."
The court discussed the "plain view" exception to the fourth
amendment.' 2 The officer did not have probable cause to believe
that the film canister contained drugs. Although he knew that cer-
tain people kept drugs in film canisters, this knowledge provided
him with only a hunch, for film canisters are also used on a daily
basis to store film. The officer's hunch, even when coupled with the
report from an informant,'" was insufficient to permit the officer to
conduct a warrantless search.'4
In evaluating the reliability of an anonymous tip, an important
consideration is the anonymous informant's ability to provide in-
formation about the suspect that is unpredictable to a casual ob-
server. Hardy v. Commonwealth 5 involved an anonymous tele-
phone tip provided to the Richmond police. The informant stated
that the defendant, who was both described and named, was
armed, in possession of cocaine, and walking down a specific street.
Based on the tip, officers located, stopped, and frisked the defend-
ant. They found no weapon, but then removed his hat and found
the cocaine. The court of appeals characterized the detention as an
arrest, and found that the officers lacked probable cause. The in-
formant's tip provided no information beyond a description of in-
nocent behavior which any casual observer could have detected.
The tip was inadequate because it neither provided any predictive
information, nor demonstrated that the informant had inner-
knowledge of the defendant's activities.' 6
C. Unlawful Entry for Search
Three cases in the court of appeals this year discussed the law of"no-knock" entries to execute a search warrant.'7 The rationale be-
10. Id. at 149-52, 400 S.E.2d at 193-95.
11. Id. at 152, 400 S.E.2d at 195.
12. Id. at 152-55, 400 S.E.2d at 195-96.
13. The record reflected nothing regarding the informant's reliability. Id. at 154, 400
S.E.2d at 196.
14. Id.; see also Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541 (1990).
15. 11 Va. App. 433, 399 S.E.2d 27 (1990).
16. Id. at 436, 399 S.E.2d at 28-29.
17. See Gladden v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 595, 400 S.E.2d 791 (1991); Delacruz v.
Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 335, 398 S.E.2d 103 (1990); Grover v. Commonwealth, 11 Va.
App. 143, 396 S.E.2d 863 (1990).
7331991]
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hind the rule generally prohibiting no-knock entries was well-illus-
trated in Delacruz v. Commonwealth.'8 In Grover v. Common-
wealth,19 the insertion of a pass-key into the lock of a hotel room
door prior to the officer's knocking and announcing his presence
was merely preparatory and did not amount to an "entry."20 The
officer's failure in Gladden v. Commonwealth2 ' was in not knock-
ing on the door with his knuckles or fist, or ringing the doorbell,
the "universally recognized signals to the occupants of a dwelling
that someone is at the door wishing to gain entrance."2
In Lanier v. Commonwealth,2' the court of appeals recognized
an exception to the "good faith" doctrine regarding information
supplied to ascertain a search warrant. The court affirmed the de-
nial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence which was ob-
tained pursuant to a search warrant. It held that the defendant
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that false
information was provided to the magistrate who issued the search
warrant.24
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Double jeopardy protects defendants against multiple punish-
ments and multiple prosecutions for the same offense. For double
jeopardy purposes, the supreme court held in Grady v. Corbin2
that offenses are considered to be the "same" offense when the
government prosecutes conduct in a subsequent trial which consti-
tutes an offense for which the defendant has already been tried.
However, where the convictions occur in a single trial, only the
18. 11 Va. App. 335, 398 S.E.2d 103 (1990).
19. 11 Va. App. 143, 396 S.E.2d 863 (1990).
20. Id. at 145, 396 S.E.2d at 865.
21. 11 Va. App. 595, 400 S.E.2d 791 (1991).
22. Id. at 600, 400 S.E.2d at 793. The officer had created some noise in unsuccessfully
attempting to tap a hydraulic jack into place between the crack of the door and the door
jamb. He treated the tapping as the equivalent of a knock, announced "Police Officer,
search warrant," and then gained entrance with a sledge hammer. The court viewed the
question as "not the amount of noise created by the officer, but rather what the noise com-
municates to the occupants within." Id.
23. 10 Va. App. 541, 394 S.E.2d 495 (1990).
24. Id. at 548, 394 S.E.2d at 500; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
(stating that suppression remains the appropriate remedy where the judge or magistrate
who issued the search warrant was misled by false information intentionally or recklessly
provided by the affiant); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (establishing the proce-
dure for challenging the veracity of an affiant's statements made in application of a search
warrant).
25. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
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prohibition against multiple punishments is applicable. In this re-
spect, the test articulated in Blockburger v: United States26 is
determinative.
In Low v. Commonwealth,27 the court of appeals discussed the
law of double jeopardy and the Grady decision. The defendant in
Low, who was previously convicted of assault, was tried and con-
victed of the robbery which occurred by virtue of the same assault-
ive conduct. This prosecution was held to have violated Grady, and
thus it constituted double jeopardy. Consequently, the conviction
was reversed and the indictment dismissed.28
Similarly, the question in Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth,29 was
whether double jeopardy prohibited convictions both for destruc-
tion of private property under section 18.2-137 of the Code of Vir-
ginia ("Code") and breaking and entering under section 18.2-91 of
the Code, where the destruction of private property occurred inci-
dental to the breaking and entering. The court of appeals held that
because each offense required proof of a fact not required by the
other, both convictions were permissible.30
IV. DUE PROCESS
An identification procedure that is so suggestive as to make the
resulting identification unreliable violates due process.3 " The pro-
cedures most susceptible to challenge for impermissible suggestive-
ness are single-photograph displays,3 2 and one-on-one confronta-
tions.3 Determining whether the identification is nevertheless
reliable is governed by factors identified by the United States Su-
26. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The traditional test is that the prosecution of two offenses arising
from the same act is not barred if each offense requires the proof of an element which the
other does not. Nevertheless, this is not the end of the inquiry, for even if the offenses are
the same under Blockburger, the question remains whether the General Assembly intended
cumulative punishments for the two offenses. Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 726,
284 S.E.2d 796, 798 (1981).
27. 11 Va. App. 48, 396 S.E.2d 383 (1990).
28. Id. at 52-53, 396 S.E.2d at 385-86.
29. 11 Va. App. 625, 401 S.E.2d 208 (1991).
30. Id.
31. Smith v. Thompson, 1 Va. App. 407, 339 S.E.2d 556 (1986).
32. See Hudson v. Blackburn, 601 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086
(1980); Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 178, 367 S.E.2d 197 (1988).
33. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972); Smith v. Thompson, 1 Va. App. 407, 339
S.E.2d 556 (1986). This is not a favored procedure, see Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02
(1967), but the resulting identification may be admissible. Delong v. Commonwealth, 234
Va. 357, 362 S.E.2d 669 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
preme Court in Neil v. Biggers.3 4
At issue in Curtis v. Commonwealth," was the admissibility of
out-of-court and in-court identifications of the defendant. The vic-
tim had been shot while attending a party. He was unable to iden-
tify the defendant when shown a single photograph at the hospital.
However, he positively identified the defendant at the preliminary
hearing and at trial.
Determining whether the identifications were admissible, the
court of appeals applied the two-step test established by the
United States Supreme Court in Biggers.3 First, the court found
that the single-photo display was unduly suggestive. The court
considered whether the identification was nevertheless so reliable
as to preclude any substantial likelihood of misidentification. 7 The
court was unable to determine from the record the accuracy of the
victim's description. A critical factor in the court's decision was the
victim's inability to identify the defendant when he first viewed
the photograph, notwithstanding the explanation offered by the
prosecution. The court held that the out-of-court identification
was unreliable. 8 The court then considered the admissibility of the
in-court identification, which depended upon whether its origin
was independent of the unduly suggestive out-of-court identifica-
tion procedure.3 9 In Wise v. Commonwealth,40 the in-court identifi-
cation was inadmissible because of the witnesses' uncertainty at
trial and their reference to the photographs used in the out-of-
court identification procedure. In Curtis, however, the witness
made a positive, unequivocal identification of the defendant based
entirely upon the witness's observation at the time of the- crime,
independent of the suggestive photographic display.4' Accordingly,
the admission of his in-court identification of the defendant was
not in error.
In Bryant v. Commonwealth,42 an eight-year-old victim was
shown three color photographs of a man she knew had been ar-
rested near the apartment building where her abduction had oc-
34. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
35. 11 Va. App. 28, 396 S.E.2d 386 (1990).
36. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
37. Curtis, 11 Va. App. at 31-32, 396 S.E.2d at 388.
38. Id. at 32, 396 S.E.2d at 388.
39. See Hill v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 683, 693, 347 S.E.2d 913, 918 (1986).
40. 6 Va. App. 178, 186, 367 S.E.2d 197, 202 (1988).
41. Curtis, 11 Va. App. at 33, 396 S.E.2d at 389.
42. 10 Va. App. 421, 393 S.E.2d 216 (1990).
736 [Vol. 25:731
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curred, and near the time of her abduction. Although the court
reached the "inescapable conclusion" that the viewing occurred
under unnecessarily suggestive conditions, other evidence suffi-
ciently established the reliability of the child's out-of-court identi-
fication to permit admission."'
The use of informants in law enforcement occasionally prompts
motions for the disclosure of their identity. The court of appeals
discussed the law pertaining to the "informer's privilege" in Lanier
v. Commonwealth."" The defendant in Lanier argued that he was
entitled to the informant's identity because the informant might
have information relevant to a defense of entrapment or accommo-
dation. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of his motion,
holding that the defendant had presented only inadequate specula-
tion. In Roviaro v. United States,45 the case was distinguished by
the absence of evidence in Lanier that the informant had partici-
pated in the crime alleged. 6
V. INTERROGATION
Whenever a person is in police custody, or otherwise deprived of
his freedom in any significant way,4 7 he must be advised of certain
constitutional rights before he can be interrogated.48 In Shell v.
Commonwealth,49 despite a change of circumstances between two
43. Bryant, 10 Va. App. at 426, 393 S.E.2d at 219.
44. 10 Va. App. 541, 551, 394 S.E.2d 495, 502 (1990). The privilege is described by the
court as a "public policy right which protect[s] the identity of persons who furnish informa-
tion relating to violations of the law from disclosure absent government consent to such
disclosure." Id. at 550, 394 S.E.2d at 556; see also Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 356
S.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987); Keener v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 208, 380
S.E.2d 21 (1989).
45. 353 U.S. 53 (1957). The United States Supreme Court held that whether the identity
of an informant must be disclosed depends upon whether the information "is relevant and
helpful to the defense of the accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause." Id.
at 60-61. In Rouiaro, it was not possible for the Court to say that the informant would
provide testimony establishing a defense. Id at 60 n.8.
46. 10 Va. App. at 552-53, 394 S.E.2d at 503.
47. The determination of whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda de-
pends on whether there exists, on an objective basis, a "'restraint of freedom of movement'
of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Wass v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27, 32,
359 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1987) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quot-
ing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1977))). The court of appeals has made this
determination. See Lanier, 10 Va. App. at 554-56, 394 S.E.2d at 503-04. The court of ap-
peals rejected the defendant's contention that he was in custody as he sat in the back of a
marked police car. Id. at 556, 394 S.E.2d at 504.
48. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
49. 11 Va. App. 247, 397 S.E.2d 673 (1991). The circumstantial change was a ten minute
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separate interrogations, the court held that the second set of detec-
tives was not obligated to again advise the defendant of the Mi-
randa warnings he had received and waived prior to the first
interrogation.5 0
In another case, the police ignored the defendant's two custodial
requests for counsel and continued their interrogation until the de-
fendant incriminated himself.51 The court of appeals, sitting en
banc, held that the defendant's statement "was not obtained by
physical coercion or other deliberate means calculated to break the
suspect's will."'52 Because the court of appeals held that the first
statement was not coerced, it did not have to conclude that the
subsequent statements were tainted by the Miranda violation.5 3
The sole and determinative question was whether the subsequent
statements were voluntary.54
In Williams v. Commonwealth,55 the defendant's entire tape-re-
corded confession was admitted to prove voluntariness, over his
objection that it was inadmissible in its entirety because it con-
tained admissions to at least sixteen robberies besides the two for
which he was on trial. The court of appeals held that this proce-
dure was not error. The initial determination of admissibility poses
a question of voluntariness for the trial judge. If admitted, then
the fact-finder is entitled to consider the circumstances surround-
ing the statement to determine the weight to be accorded the con-
lapse between interrogations; the second interrogation involved a different topic with no
forewarning, and the detectives conducting the second interrogation were from another ju-
risdiction. Id. at 250-51. 397 S.E.2d at 677-78.
50. Id. at 256, 397 S.E.2d at 678.
51. When an accused, in police custody, invokes his right to counsel, interrogation must
cease. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. Subsequent statements made in response to continued
interrogation are not admissible. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981). The only
exception is where the accused initiates further communication. In such an instance, the
burden is on the government "to show that subsequent events indicated a waiver of the
Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during the interrogation," Oregon v. Brad-
shaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983), and ,to remain silent. Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va.
454, 352 S.E.2d 352, cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987). In addition, the waiver must be
shown to be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privi-
lege. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482. These determinations are made by evaluating the totality of
the circumstances, including the conduct of the police. Id. The government must also show
that the subsequent statements and waivers were not the tainted products of the earlier
violation. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963).
52. Mundy v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 461, 390 S.E.2d 525 (1990).
53. Id. at 473, 390 S.E.2d at 531. The court did not distinguish between a simple failure
to give the Miranda warnings and an intentional violation of the defendant's rights.
54. Id.; see also Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 35-36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1991).
55. 11 Va. App. 149, 396 S.E.2d 860 (1990).
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fession. In this case the evidence of other crimes was admissible
because the promise not to prosecute these other charges was rele-
vant to a determination of the weight and credibility. 6
Finally, the court of appeals held that cross-examination regard-
ing post-arrest silence on a particular interrogation topic was per-
missible where the defendant gave a purportedly complete account
of the shooting.57
VI. GRAND JURIES
The decision of the court of appeals in Vihko v. Common-
wealth,58 established law on numerous issues arising from a Com-
monwealth's attorney's aggressive use of a special grand jury. The
court approved the participation of investigators who attended ses-
sions of the special grand jury while witnesses testified, joined in
the interrogation of the witnesses, and testified regarding the re-
sults of their investigative efforts. The fact that one of the investi-
gators gave an unsworn and unrecorded presentation of his find-
ings to the special grand jury, despite the requirements of sections
19.2-208 and 19.2-212 of the Code, was of no significance. 59
The court held that the only purpose of requiring the presence
of a court reporter was for the grand jury's convenience.60 The spe-
cial grand jury was authorized to release its tapes and records to a
regular grand jury. The defendant was not entitled to relief for
any unauthorized disclosure because he could not demonstrate
prejudice."
The court further held that the preparation of the special grand
jury's report is a clerical task which the grand jury may properly
delegate to the Commonwealth's attorney, so long as the special
grand jury arrives at its conclusions through untrammeled
deliberations.62
Finally, the court determined that the omission of the name of
the witness testifying before a grand jury in contravention of sec-
tion 19.2-202 of the Code does not constitute grounds to quash the
56. Id. at 153, 396 S.E.2d at 863.
57. Fain v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 450, 459, 393 S.E.2d 634, 639 (1990).
58. 10 Va. App. 498, 393 S.E.2d 413 (1990).
59. Id. at 503, 393 S.E.2d at 416-17.
60. Id. at 503, 393 S.E.2d at 416.
61. Id. at 504-05, 393 S.E.2d at 417.
62. Id. at 502, 393 S.E.2d at 416.
1991]
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indictment.6 3
VII. TRIALS
Many of the decisions from the court of appeals during this past
year concerned issues which arise during trial. One less frequently
encountered question was raised when the Commonwealth did not
meet its burden of proving subject-matter jurisdiction. The court
of appeals found no direct or circumstantial evidence in the record
in Owusu v. Commonwealth6 4 to prove that the alleged crime oc-
curred within the Commonwealth. Because jurisdiction must be
shown on the record,65 the judgment was reversed and the case
remanded. 6
A. Amendments
An amendment to an indictment which enhances the possible
punishment, or alleges a different intent in conjunction with the
same overt acts, does not change the general nature or character of
the crime alleged.6 7 Counsel should not assume that a day-of-trial
amendment to an indictment will entitle the defendant to a con-
tinuance. Where the evidence belies a defendant's assertion of sur-
prise, the trial court does not err in denying a motion for a
continuance."8
63. Vihko, 10 Va. App. at 505, 393 S.E.2d at 417-18.
64. 11 Va. App. 671, 401 S.E.2d 431 (1991).
65. Shelton v. Sydnor, 126 Va. 625, 630, 102 S.E. 83, 85 (1920).
66. Owusu, 11 Va. App. at 674, 401 S.E.2d at 432. In this case the court was not required
to resolve the conflict between § 19.2-239 of the Code (circuit court has jurisdiction in crimi-
nal cases over "all presentments, indictments and informations for offenses committed
within their respective circuits") and § 17-123 of the Code (circuit court has jurisdiction
over all felonies committed within the Commonwealth). See also Cheng v. Commonwealth,
240 Va. 26, 36-38, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990) (considering sufficiency issues relating to
venue). Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-239 (Repl. Vol. 1989) with Id. § 17-123 (Repl. Vol.
1988).
67. Smith v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 592, 594, 394 S.E.2d 30, 31 (1990); see also
Willis v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 430, 438, 393 S.E.2d 405, 408 (1990) (an amendment
which increases punishment and does not change conduct originally alleged does not change
nature or character of the offense charged).
68. Willis, 10 Va. App. at 438-39, 393 S.E.2d at 406; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-231
(Repl. Vol. 1990).
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B. Assistance of Counsel
A violation of a defendant's sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel can never be dismissed as harmless error, and
the court will presume prejudice where counsel has an actual con-
flict of interest.6 9 The possibility of a conflict creates a duty on the
part of the trial court to make the appropriate inquiries,7 0 or risk
reversal based on a presumption that an apparent conflict resulted
in ineffective assistance of counsel.71
In Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 the prosecutor, during a pre-trial
hearing, accused the defense counsel of professional misconduct.
Counsel sought leave to withdraw, but the court denied the mo-
tion. The case went to trial and the defendant was convicted.
While the court of appeals did not determine whether an actual
conflict existed, the court viewed the situation as presenting at
least a potential conflict of interest,73 which the trial court should
have acknowledged and considered. The judgment of conviction
was vacated, and the case was remanded for a determination of the
conflict issue.
C. Separate Trials
Relying on the holding of the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Cheng v. Commonwealth, 4 the court of appeals has held that the
determination of whether different charges should be tried sepa-
rately should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.75 A
circuit court has no discretion in accepting a guilty plea, if ten-
dered to the indictment without a plea agreement, even if tendered
mid-trial, unless it determines that the plea is constitutionally
invalid. 6
69. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
70. Dowell v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 555, 559, 351 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1987).
71. Id. at 561, 351 S.E.2d at 918.
72. 11 Va. App. 569, 400 S.E.2d 540 (1991).
73. The court found that "counsel were required to conduct an effective defense of the
accused in an atmosphere where a potential defense witness possibly had been compro-
mised, where the prosecutor had made allegations of misconduct and still held open the
possibility of bringing ethical charges, and where the trial judge declared in open court that
the prosecutor had the discretion to bring those charges." Id. at 574, 400 S.E.2d at 543.
74. 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 599 (1990).
75. Ferrell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 380, 399 S.E.2d 614 (1990).
76. Graham v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 133, 397 S.E.2d 270 (1990).
1991]
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D. Continuances
The defendant in Bolden v. Commonwealth7 7 appealed his mis-
demeanor convictions from the circuit court. The defendant re-
fused appointed counsel and successfully moved several times for
continuances in order to retain counsel. When his last successful
motion was granted, the trial court informed him that a subse-
quent appearance without counsel would be considered a waiver.
On appeal, the court's subsequent determination that the de-
fendant waived his right to counsel when he again appeared unrep-
resented was affirmed.78 The court contrasted this case with Lemke
v. Commonwealth, ° in which no continuances were granted to the
defendant when she first appeared on appeal from the general dis-
trict court.
Continuances must, when necessary, be granted. In Cherricks v.
Commonwealth,s0 a continuance should have been granted because
a subpoena sought by the defense had not been served on a wit-
ness. The circumstances indicated diligence, and belied any notion
of delay or avoidance of prosecution.8' In contrast, the defendant
in Stewart v. Commonwealth8 2 moved for a continuance mid-trial
when unexpected testimony revealed the existence of a witness he
wanted to question. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
denial of the motion. It then characterized the value of the witness
as speculative, and suggested, based on newly-discovered evidence,
that the appropriate remedy was a motion for a new trial.s3
77. 11 Va. App. 187, 397 S.E.2d 534 (1990).
78. The court of appeals discussed the sixth amendment and Virginia's constitutional
rights to representation by counsel. Furthermore, the court acknowledged a "countervailing
state interest. . . in proceeding with prosecutions on an orderly and expeditious basis." Id.
at 190, 397 S.E.2d at 536. Waiver may be found to exist by the trial court if the Common-
wealth proves by clear, precise, and unequivocal evidence that after being offered counsel,
the defendant made an intelligent and understanding waiver. Id. at 190-191, 397 S.E.2d at
536.
79. 218 Va. 870, 241 S.E.2d 789 (1978).
80. 11 Va. App. 96, 396 S.E.2d 397 (1990) (trial court abused discretion in not granting
continuance where witness was not served with subpoena which had been issued).
81. Shortness of time before trial is a customary problem for counsel, and witnesses do
not always receive much advance notice. In Bellis v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 257, 402
S.E.2d 211 (1991), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that shortness of time in itself does
not relieve a witness of his obligations under a subpoena.
82. 10 Va. App. 563, 394 S.E.2d 509 (1990).
83. Id. at 568-69, 394 S.E.2d at 513.
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E. Discovery
In Tickel v. Commonwealth,84 the court of appeals rejected a
due process claim which arose out of the Commonwealth's relin-
quishment of stolen cars to insurance companies prior to trial. The
defendant did not show bad faith on the part of the police in fail-
ing to preserve what was claimed to be potentially useful evidence.
If, however, a defendant can show clearly that "had the evidence
been properly preserved, it would. . .[form] a basis for exonerat-
ing the defendant, then absent a showing to the contrary" the
court would assume that the police were not acting in good faith.5
The detective in Conway v. Commonwealth,6 recorded a conver-
sation with the defendant. Despite a discovery order, and in viola-
tion of Rule 3A:11(b)(1) of the Supreme Court of Virginia, the re-
cording was not disclosed to the defendant until after he had
testified. This delay prejudiced the defendant, for the tape directly
supported the detective's testimony and contradicted the testi-
mony of the defendant. Furthermore, in Cherricks v. Common-
wealth,87 the court determined that Commonwealth was incorrect
when it determined that a witness's statement was not
exculpatory. 8
F. Cross-Examination
The general rule prohibiting cross-examination on irrelevant or
collateral matters was recognized by the supreme court in
Seilheimer v. Melville,89 and applied this past year in Maynard v.
Commonwealth." The supreme court affirmed a trial court's limi-
84. 11 Va. App. 558, 400 S.E.2d 534 (1991).
85. Id. at 562, 400 S.E.2d at 537.
86. 11 Va. App. 103, 397 S.E.2d 263 (1990).
87. 11 Va. App. 96, 396 S.E.2d 397 (1990).
88. Id. at 101-02, 396 S.E.2d at 400-01. The witness' statement contradicted his first
statement and supported the defendant's assertion of innocence. Cf. Taitano v. Common-
wealth, 4 Va. App. 342, 358 S.E.2d 590 (1987).
89. 224 Va. 323, 326-27, 295 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1982). The question of whether a matter is
material or collateral is answered by whether the examining party would be entitled to
prove the fact in support of his case. Allen v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 834, 842, 94 S.E. 783,
786 (1918), cited in Maynard v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 437, 444, 399 S.E.2d 635, 640
(1990).
90. 11 Va. App. 437, 399 S.E.2d 635 (1990). "A witness cannot be impeached by evidence
of a collateral fact which is not relevant to the issues of the trial, even though to some
extent it has a bearing on the issue of credibility." Id. at 444, 399 S.E.2d at 639. As the
dissent points out, however, the "collateral" fact in this case was the fact that the witness'
answer on direct examination contradicted his testimony from the first trial of the charge.
19911
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tation of defense counsel's cross-examination of a witness in Stew-
art v. Commonwealth,91 and a trial court's refusal to permit ques-
tions proffered by counsel asking the investigator what he
"figured" he would have felt "comfortable with," and what he
would have "wanted." 92
G. Jury Selection
The court of appeals and the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled
on numerous questions concerning jury selection and voir dire this
year. In two cases, Barrette v. Commonwealth"s and Webb v. Com-
monwealth,9' the court discussed the per se disqualification of cer-
tain categories of prospective jurors. In Stockton v. Common-
wealth,95 the supreme court held that the trial court did not err
when it refused to exclude a prospective juror for cause who
seemed heavily biased against violent criminals.96 It held, in Size-
more v. Commonwealth,97 that a cursory "rehabilitation" of a pro-
Id. at 456, 399 S.E.2d at 646.
91. 10 Va. App. 563, 394 S.E.2d 509 (1990). The court characterized the questioning as a
"fishing expedition" for irrelevant evidence. Id. at 568, 394 S.E.2d at 512.
92. Maynard, 11 Va. App. at 445-46, 399 S.E.2d at 640-41.
93. 11 Va. App. 357, 398 S.E.2d 695 (1990). The prospective juror in this case was retired
after 38 years of employment with Chevron. He was not disqualified by this fact, even
though the alleged robbery was of an attendant at a Chevron station. The court held also
that § 19.2-260 of the Code makes § 8.01-358 of the Code applicable to criminal procedure.
Id. at 359, 398 S.E.2d at 696-97; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-260 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
94. 11 Va. App. 220, 397 S.E.2d 539 (1990). The prospective juror in this rape case had
been the victim of a rape within the past year, and her assailant had not been apprehended.
Nevertheless, she answered that she could sit impartially. The trial court did not err in
refusing to strike her for cause. The dissent in this case suggested that discretion should not
be limited to whether or not the trial judge believed the juror's assurances. Rather, the
judge should focus on whether the juror's presence would prevent the jury from being "as
free from suspicion as possible." Id. at 224, 397 S.E.2d at 541 (Barrow, J. dissenting); see
Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 375, 337 S.E.2d 729, 733 (1985).
95. 241 Va. 192, 402 S.E.2d 196 (1991).
96. Id. at 199-200, 402 S.E.2d at 200. The prospective juror's grandson had been shot and
killed two years earlier. The juror belonged to "Family and Friends Against Crime Today,"
and said that he would like to see his grandson's killers executed.
97. 11 Va. App. 208, 397 S.E.2d 408 (1991). Three potential jurors stated during voir dire
that they would expect the defendant to produce evidence showing that he was not guilty.
The only rehabilitative question was whether they could follow the instruction that the
Commonwealth had the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The jurors' affirmation was not sufficient. The appropriate test and the law surrounding
the issue were discussed. Id. at 212-13, 397 S.E.2d at 411. The problem with the attempted
rehabilitation in this case was that the jurors were not told that an accused is not required
to produce evidence and that the fact of not doing so could not be considered by them.
They should have been examined as to their ability to follow this principle of law. Without
the inclusion of this factor, their answers to the single rehabilitation question were meaning-
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spective juror who has given a disqualifying answer may be
insufficient.
Eyewitness identification is notoriously unreliable and a juror's
evaluation of eyewitness testimony is susceptible to a number of
mistaken beliefs.98 A prospective juror's undue bias in favor of this
type of testimony might seem to be an appropriate line of inquiry
on voir dire. The court of appeals, however, affirmed a trial court's
refusal to permit these questions."9
In Scott v. Commonwealth,100 the trial court erred in not grant-
ing the defendant a new trial where evidence was adduced before
sentencing that the jury officer made improper comments to pro-
spective jurors during an orientation session.101
H. Shackled Defendants
The supreme court and the court of appeals both considered
cases involving gagged or shackled defendants. Under the circum-
stances in Stockton v. Commonwealth,10 2 a capital murder case,
the supreme court held that it was permissible to shackle the de-
fendant during a resentencing hearing, even though the question
before the jury was whether the Commonwealth had proven "fu-
ture dangerous[ness]." 03 The court of appeals, in Martin v. Corn-
less. The matter was remanded for a new trial. Id.
98. See generally LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1990).
99. Barrett v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 357, 398 S.E.2d 695 (1990). Trial counsel
sought to ask two questions: 1) whether any of the prospective jurors believed that eyewit-
ness identifications were always accurate and correct, and 2) whether any jurors believed
that an eyewitness who was confident of his identification was always accurate and correct.
The court of appeals did not view these question as pertinent to the jurors' ability to "stand
indifferent" and to weigh the evidence impartially. Id. at 359, 398 S.E.2d at 696.
Part of the failing identified by the court was that the questions did not relate to any
evidence which was vouched to be forthcoming, nor did they appear in terms "relating to
assessing credibility or weighing evidence or the law governing the function and duties of
jurors." Id. at 361, 398 S.E.2d at 697.
100. 11 Va. App. 516, 399 S.E.2d 648 (1990).
101. The court of appeals, sitting en banc, stated: "Private communications, possibly
prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are abso-
lutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to
appear." Id. at 520, 399 S.E.2d at 650 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150
(1892)). A heavy burden rests on the government to establish that the contact was harmless.
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). The evidence was insufficient on the
record to rebut the presumption of prejudicial harm, and the court of appeals reversed the
denial of the motion and remanded the case for a new trial. Scott, 11 Va. App. at 523, 399
S.E.2d at 652.
102. 241 Va. 192, 402 S.E.2d 196 (1991).
103. Id. at 198-99, 402 S.E.2d at 199.
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monwealth,104 reversed and remanded a case because of the trial
court's abuse of discretion in gagging the defendant. The court's
decision discusses the considerations to be weighed in contempla-
tion of such an action, outlines the burden on defense counsel to
make specific objections, and mentions the duty of the trial court
to make a record of specific findings.10 5
I. Instructions
In Bellfield v. Commonwealth,'06 the court of appeals distin-
guished and interpreted Sansone v. United States10 7 in holding
that it is reversible error to fail to give a proffered instruction for
which there is credible evidence. 10 8 The court read Sansone to
mean that a lesser-included offense instruction is required when-
ever the charged offense requires proof of a fact not necessary for
conviction of the lesser offense. Conflicting testimony as to the de-
terminative factual issue is not necessary to the entitlement of the
instruction. 09
Giving an instruction on concert of action need not be limited to
cases involving allegations of felony murder. The instruction may
be given where the purpose of the concerted action was to commit
a wrongful act, and where the crime which results is "an incidental,
probable consequence of the original enterprise, plan or
purpose."" 0
J. Sentencing
A sentencing judge may impose conditions on a suspended sen-
tence lasting longer than the maximum period for which the de-
104. 11 Va. App. 397, 399 S.E.2d 623 (1990).
105. Id. at 405-06, 399 S.E.2d at 627-28.
106. 11 Va. App. 310, 398 S.E.2d 90 (1990).
107. 380 U.S. 343 (1965).
108. In Beilfield, an undercover police officer had been approached earlier in the day by
the defendant, who engaged the officer in conversation pertinent to a drug transaction.
Later that day, during the execution of a search warrant, the defendant was arrested with
two units of cocaine in his pocket, and two units on the ground near him. Bellfield, 11 Va.
App. at 312, 398 S.E.2d at 91. On this set of facts, the trial court erred in not giving an
instruction on simple possession, even though the defendant did not testify. Id. at 315, 398
S.E.2d at 92-93 (citing Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 341 S.E.2d 190 (1986); Guss
v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 13, 225 S.E.2d 196 (1976)).
109. Id. at 314, 398 S.E.2d at 93.
110. Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 544, 399 S.E.2d 823, 828 (1991).
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fendant could have been sentenced.111 The court's authority in this
regard is not absolute, but must be exercised with "due regard to
the gravity of the offense."11 2 A trial court may revoke a suspended
sentence because of a new crime committed while the execution of
sentence was suspended pending appeal to the supreme court." 3
K. New Trials
To be entitled to a new trial, the moving party must set out in
an affidavit facts describing his efforts and explaining why he was
unable to secure the evidence he proffers in support of his post-
trial motion. The trial court may require the moving party to prove
that the new evidence demonstrates the mistake or perjury alleged
"beyond question" and not merely as a matter of belief or
opinion.' 4
An illustrative case, and one in which the court of appeals held
that a new trial should have been granted, is Fisher v. Common-
wealth."5 The defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual bat-
tery based on the testimony of his six-year-old granddaughter, who
drew a picture of a male with an erection. The defendant's son had
been prohibited by his mother from talking to his father, who had
been ordered by the court not to contact family members. When
the son attended the trial, he realized the importance of many as-
pects of the six-year-old's habits and character."6 The court of ap-
peals characterized the evidence later proffered by the son as ma-
terial and highly probative. Because it "was not accessible prior to
trial due to its nature, those who were privy to it, and the circum-
stances which precluded its disclosure,"" 7 the newly-discovered ev-
111. Simmers v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 375, 378, 398 S.E.2d 693, 694 (1990).
112. Id. at 378, 398 S.E.2d at 694 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990)).
The trial court had sentenced the defendant to five years for leaving the scene of an acci-
dent in which a death occurred. The incarceration was suspended on the condition that the
defendant not drive for 20 years. Three years later the defendant moved to vacate this par-
ticular condition, and the instant appeal followed.
113. Singleton v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 575, 400 S.E.2d 205 (1991).
114. Carter v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 507, 513, 393 S.E.2d 639, 642 (1990) (citing
Powell v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 741, 755, 112 S.E. 657, 661 (1922)).
115. 11 Va. App. 302, 397 S.E.2d 901 (1990).
116. Id. at 304, 397 S.E.2d at 902. There was evidence that the child had been allowed to
view hard-core pornography videos and look at pornographic magazines. She had drawn
similar pictures before.
117. Id. at 305, 397 S.E.2d at 902.
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idence presented sufficient cause for a new trial.1 "
L. Miscellaneous
The statutory requirement that an unrepresented defendant sign
either a waiver or an affidavit of indigency is a procedural, not ju-
risdictional requirement." 9 For the purposes of determining the
time within which the defendant must be tried,'120 the period of
time between a defendant's appearance before a trial court for ap-
pointment of counsel and docket call is not tolled.' 2 '
An in camera proceeding in a felony case may be an incident of
trial which must be recorded verbatim. 122 The test is whether the
hearing was a stage of trial "where something could be done to
affect the defendant's interests.' 23
In Arrington v. Commonwealth,24 the Commonwealth's attor-
ney's good faith statement during his opening remarks, regarding
evidence he was later unable to produce, did not require the grant-
ing of a motion for a mistrial where the defendant was not
prejudiced. 25
Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia and the court of appeals
provided significant case law on evidentiary points common to
criminal practice. 126
118. Fisher, 11 Va. App. at 305, 397 S.E.2d at 902; see also Whittington v. Common-
wealth, 5 Va. App. 212, 361 S.E.2d 449 (1987).
119. Bolden v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 187, 193, 397 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1990).
120. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
121. Nelms v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 639, 400 S.E.2d 799 (1991).
122. Brittingham v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 530, 533, 394 S.E.2d 336, 339 (1990); see
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-165 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
123. Brittingham, 10 Va. App. at 533, 394 S.E.2d at 339. A defendant's presence is not
necessary for consideration of purely legal matters incidental to the resumption of the trial.
Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 593, 50 S.E.2d 407, 411-12 (1948). In Brittingham,
testimony was received by the trial judge in order to determine whether an assistant Com-
monwealth's attorney had promised the defendant transactional immunity. Without a rec-
ord, the court of appeals could not determine if the testimony was probative of the question;
hence, the defendant was prejudiced.
124. 10 Va. App. 446, 392 S.E.2d 844 (1990).
125. Id. at 448, 392 S.E.2d at 845-46.
126. See Stokes v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 550, 399 S.E.2d 453 (1991) (admissibility
of laboratory analysis under § 19.2-187 of the Code); Ferrell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App.
380, 399 S.E.2d 614 (1990) (guilty knowledge and modus operandi exceptions to uncharged
misconduct rule); Jones v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 75, 396 S.E.2d 844 (1990) (hearsay).
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VIII. APPEALS
A party is bound, on appeal, by concessions made at trial.12 7 A
defendant's failure to renew his motion to strike the Common-
wealth's evidence at the close of the evidence precluded him from
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. 28 A defend-
ant is deemed to have waived issues he assigns as error when he
fails to argue them on brief. 29 Contentions not raised in the peti-
tion for appeal will not be addressed. 130 The court of appeals de-
fined a proper proffer in Stewart v. Commonwealth'3' as "a unilat-
eral avowal of counsel, if unchallenged, or a mutual stipulation of
the testimony expected."' 32
In Vihko v. Commonwealth,"33 the defendant urged the court of
appeals to adopt a per se rule invalidating indictments for unau-
thorized disclosures of special grand jury material.3 The court de-
clined because such a rule would not serve the public interest, and
because any such violation as may have occurred was "neither so
egregious nor pervasive as to justify reversal for prophylactic
reasons."' 35
Not all of the decisions concerning appellate procedure were ad-
verse to criminal defendants. In Harrell v. Commonwealth,"36 the
court of appeals stated that it could not, on review, "disregard
credible, unimpeached evidence of the Commonwealth which ex-
culpates the defendant and creates a reasonable doubt.' 1 37 The su-
preme court applied the Rule 5:25 "ends of justice" exception (the"contemporaneous objection rule") in reversing a conviction where
the trial court's instruction omitted a material element of the
crime charged. 38
127. Low v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 48, 51, 396 S.E.2d 383, 384 (1990); VA. Sup. CT.
R. 5A:18.
128. Smith v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 592, 595, 394 S.E.2d 30, 31 (1990) (citing
White v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 231, 233, 346 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1986)).
129. Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 370, 402 S.E.2d 218, 222 (1991).
130. Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 363, 364, 398 S.E.2d 690, 690-91 n.1 (1990)
(citing VA. Sup. CT. R. 5A:12(C)).
131. 10 Va. App. 563, 394 S.E.2d 509 (1990).
132. Id. at 568, 394 S.E.2d at 512.
133. 10 Va. App. 498, 393 S.E.2d 413 (1990).
134. Id. at 500, 393 S.E.2d at 417.
135. Id. at 505, 393 S.E.2d at 417.
136. 11 Va. App. 1, 396 S.E.2d 680 (1990).
137. Id. at 11, 393 S.E.2d at 685 (quoting Harward v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 468,
479, 364 S.E.2d 511, 516 (1988)).
138. Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 249-50, 402 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1991).
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IX. CRIMES
A. Homicide and Self-Defense
In Stockton v. Commonwealth,"9 the defendant's death sen-
tence was vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing. During
the resentencing proceeding, the transcript of testimony given dur-
ing the guilt phase of the original trial was read to the jury. The
defendant objected that this procedure violated his right to con-
frontation. The supreme court disagreed, noting that the use of the
transcript was limited to informing the jury of the nature of the
offense for which the defendant had been convicted.140 In the same
case, relying on Franklin v. Lynaugh'4' and Frye v. Common-
wealth,42 the court held that the defendant was not entitled to
present evidence or argument that he was innocent. 43 The court
also declined to consider argument that the verdict form pre-
scribed by section 19.2-264.4(D) of the Code "discouraged the jury
from giving effect to. . .mitigating evidence once it found an ag-
gravating factor.' 1 44
1. Premeditation
The court of appeals rejected a defendant's claim that the evi-
dence was insufficient to establish premeditation where the de-
fendant testified that he killed his father in a rage.145 Similarly, in
Hargrove v. Commonwealth,46 the court found no evidence to jus-
tify the conclusion that the defendant should have known of the
likelihood of his falling asleep while driving. The evidence
presented in Hargrove did not preclude the reasonable hypothesis
that the defendant reasonably believed he could drive home safely;
thus, the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to support the
conviction of involuntary manslaughter. 47 Furthermore, in Cheng
v. Commonwealth,4 ' the supreme court reversed a conviction of
139. 241 Va. 192, 402 S.E.2d 196 (1991).
140. Id. at 203-07, 402 S.E.2d at 202-06.
141. 487 U.S. 164, reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1263 (1988).
142. 231 Va. 370, 345 S.E.2d 267 (1986).
143. Stockton, 241 Va. at 210-11, 402 S.E.2d at 207.
144. Id. at 215, 402 S.E.2d at 209.
145. Shell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 247, 257, 397 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1990).
146. 10 Va. App. 618, 394 S.E.2d 729 (1990).
147. Id. at 622, 394 S.E.2d at 732.
148. 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 594 (1990).
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capital murder where the circumstantial evidence did not justify
an inference that the defendant was the actual perpetrator.149
2. Self-Defense
Several recent decisions addressed self-defense. In Bolyard v.
Commonwealth,50 the defendant testified that he killed the victim
in self-defense when the victim attacked him with a gun. Other
witnesses said the victim was unarmed. The court of appeals held
that the testimony did not permit a jury instruction on involuntary
manslaughter.' 51 In another case, Delacruz v. Commonwealth,'152
the trial court erred because it did not give a jury instruction for
self-defense when the evidence supported the defendant's
theory.153
3. Retreat From Aggression
The distinction between justifiable and excusable homicide was
discussed in Foote v. Commonwealth.54 Because Foote was with-
out fault in the inception of the aggression, he was not required to
retreat before offering resistance. When he stopped and fired at his
attacker while he was being chased, he engaged in a legitimate con-
tinuing resistance. Having been confronted by deadly force, he was
within his rights to use deadly force in return. 55
149. Id. at 42-43, 393 S.E.2d at 608.
150. 11 Va. App. 274, 397 S.E.2d 894 (1990).
151. Id. at 276-77, 397 S.E.2d at 896. An "accidental" killing, occurring during the com-
mission of an unlawful act, such as mutual combat, is involuntary manslaughter. In cases
such as Bolyard, where the death was not accidental, the killing was either an act of self-
defense or it was not. In some cases, however, self-defense may have an application to acci-
dental deaths. If, for example, the defendant accidentally kills the decedent while the de-
fendant is defending himself, he is entitled to acquittal.
152. 11 Va. App. 335, 398 S.E.2d 103 (1990).
153. The defendant had testified that when he heard the commotion caused by police
officers conducting a no-knock entry to execute a search warrant, he thought a robbery was
underway. He armed himself and stood by the closed door leading into his room. When the
policq broke open this door, he was knocked down. At trial he explained that the bran-
dishing of his firearm for which he was convicted, was an accident, incidental to his fall. Id.
at 337-38, 398 S.E.2d at 104-05.
154. 11 Va. App. 61, 396 S.E.2d 851; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
155. Id. at 68-69, 396 S.E.2d at 855-56.
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4. Felony Murder: Drug Use
Assisting another in ingesting a lethal dose of a controlled sub-
stance may form the basis for a conviction of felony murder under
section 18.2-33 of the Code.15 6
B. Mob Crimes
Criminal liability may attach for certain crimes committed while
a member of a mob, as defined by section 18.2-38 of the Code,
without any act of aiding or abetting.17 In Harrell v. Common-
wealth, the court of appeals discussed the criteria distinguishing
individual behavior while part of a mob from "mob" behavior.'58 In
this case, it was just as likely that the acts in question were those
of individuals involved in a fray, as they were those of a mob as-
sembled for a criminal purpose. 5 '
C. Conspiracy
The "totality of the circumstances" test for determining whether
there is one or multiple conspiracies was adopted from United
States v. MacDougall'6 0 in Barber v. Commonwealth.'"' In Bow-
man v. Commonwealth, e2 the court of appeals applied the relevant
factors and agreed with the appellant that he was involved in only
one continuing conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 63
156. Hickman v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 369, 372-73, 398 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1990). In
this case the defendant did not make the distribution or inject the drugs into the victim. His
conduct was limited to participating jointly with the victim in the possession of cocaine, and
as a principal in the second degree to the victim's ingestion. Id.
157. Harrell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 1, 7-8, 396 S.E.2d 680, 683 (1990).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 11, 396 S.E.2d at 685. The statutory definition requires only that the members
of the mob "collectively band together with the common purpose and intention of commit-
ting an assault and battery upon a person." Id. at 7, 396 S.E.2d at 683. An express call to
join forces is not necessary, as the purpose and intent may be inferred from the circum-
stances. However, neither mere assemblage, nor the fact of an assault by members of the
group, is sufficient to demonstrate intent. Id.
160. 790 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1986).
161. 5 Va. App. 172, 177, 360 S.E.2d 888, 890-91 (1987).
162. 11 Va. App. 259, 397 S.E.2d 886 (1990).
163. Id. at 266, 397 S.E.2d at 890. The court held that the defendant could not be con-
victed for each separate agreement to distribute cocaine, but only for one conspiracy. Woo-
ten v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 89, 368 S.E.2d 693 (1988), was distinguishable because it
involved different conspiracies to distribute different drugs. The agreement in Bowman was
to distribute only one drug, cocaine, and was not susceptible to prosection as multiple con-
spiracies under Wooten. Bowman, 11 Va. App. at 266, 397 S.E.2d at 890.
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In the same case, the court held that in passing section 18.2-23.1
of the Code, the General Assembly did not intend to prohibit pros-
ecutors from prosecuting for conspiracy a person who has been
convicted of one of many offenses committed during the course of
the conspiracy. If, as was the case here, the defendant committed a
series of related offenses on different dates and was convicted for
the underlying offense on only certain dates, he can be convicted of
conspiracy for any of the remaining dates. Also, the prosecutor
must be able to prove the conspiracy without the introduction of
evidence of the substantive offense for which the defendant has
already been tried.'
A conviction for acting as a principal in the second degree does
not require specific intent of the defendant to commit the crime.
Instead, the Commonwealth need only show the defendant's
awareness, actual or constructive, of the principal's intention and
that he in some way encouraged, incited or aided the principal in
the commission of the crime. 6 5 In Bell v. Commonwealth,'6  rob-
bers told their victims to remain in the building for ten minutes or
they would be shot. Then, they lighted a gasoline-soaked cushion
in front of the only exit, telling the victims it would not hurt them,
but only slow them down. Smoke and heat filled the room. The
court of appeals held that this evidence presented was sufficient to
demonstrate an intent to kill, to support a conviction for at-
tempted capital murder. 6 7
D. Traffic and DUI
1. Refusing to be Tested
In Commonwealth v. Rafferty,6 8 the supreme court held that
the charge of unreasonably refusing to take a blood or breath test
is administrative and civil in nature. 6 9 The Commonwealth can
appeal an adverse decision to the supreme court. The proceeding
must be commenced by summons.170
164. Id. at 264, 397 S.E.2d at 888-89.
165. Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 540, 399 S.E.2d 823, 826-27 (1991).
166. 11 Va. App. 530, 399 S.E.2d 450 (1991).
167. Id.
168. 241 Va. 319, 402 S.E.2d 17 (1991).
169. Id. at 324-25, 402 S.E.2d at 20.
170. Id. at 324, 402 S.E.2d at 20. It was not fatal that the magistrate's certificate or re-
fusal was not attached to the summons as required as by § 18.2-268(Q) of the Code. Id. at
324-25, 402 S.E.2d at 20-21.
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2. Blood Alcohol Test Analysis
Because of a statutory provision requiring that blood samples be
stored in sealed containers, when a vial of a person's blood is re-
ceived by a forensic laboratory unsealed, the court cannot assume
that the blood samples belong to the defendant, even if there is no
evidence of tampering or breakage.' Thus, in Williams v. Com-
monwealth,1 72 the unsealed condition of the vial was held not to be
a mere procedural matter covered by section 18.2-268(Z) of the
Code. In the absence of statutory compliance, the trial court erred
in assuming that it had the correct vial of blood before it.17 s This
year the court of appeals also held that a certificate of blood analy-
sis proffered into evidence pursuant to section 18.2-268(L) of the
Code must be filed in accordance with the requirements of section
19.2-187 of the Code. 17 The language "as indicated by a chemical
analysis" creates a presumption that the blood alcohol content de-
termined by the test is the blood alcohol content at the time of the
offense. 7 15
3. Driving While Intoxicated
Section 18.2-2166 of the Code concerns operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated. 76 The City of Manassas successfully incorpo-
rated by reference section 18.2-266(i) of the Code into a city ordi-
nance.177 A Fairfax ordinance, which provided penalties for the of-
fense of driving while intoxicated, was held invalid because it did
not provide that convictions under section 18.2-266 of the Code
could be considered prior convictions for purposes of enhancing
punishment. 7 8
171. 10 Va. App. 636, 394 S.E.2d at 729.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Basfeild v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 122, 124, 398 S.E.2d 80, 81 (1990). The court
found no conflict or inconsistency between the two statutes noting that:
[Clode § 18.2-268(1) provides for admissibility in the context of the implied consent
law, imposing the requirement of submission to testing and prescribing the proce-
dures by which that requirement is enforced. Section 19.2-187 imposes a condition for
exoneration of an otherwise hearsay document from the application of the Hearsay
Rule, thus making that document inadmissible.
Id.
175. Id. at 125, 398 S.E.2d at 81-82.
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-246 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
177. Reardon v. City of Manassas, 11 Va. App. 244, 245, 397 S.E.2d 544, 545 (1990).
178. Commonwealth v. Knott, 11 Va. App. 44, 396 S.E.2d 148 (1990). The ordinance ran
afoul of the prohibition in VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-132 of lesser punishments in local ordi-
nances than those prescribed by the general law. Id.
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4. Habitual Offenders
To be effective, a suit to declare a prisoner an habitual offender
need not be brought against his appointed committee. 179 However,
the fact that a non-resident did not actually receive notice of a
show cause proceeding to declare him an habitual offender did not
affect the validity of the judgment where the Commonwealth had
complied with the provisions of the Code relating to substituted
service. 18o
5. Radar
Finally, although evidence is not admissible to challenge gener-
ally the reliability of radar for measuring speed,181 evidence may be
heard alleging that a particular reading may be inaccurate. 2
E. Property offenses
Section 18.2-104(b) of the Code provides for enhanced punish-
ment for convictions under section 18.2-103 if the defendant has
been previously convicted of a "like" offense.'83 The crime of utter-
ing a bad check is not a "like" offense for purposes of this
statute."8 4
Common law trespass is not a lesser-included offense of statu-
tory burglary under section 18.2-91 of the Code, even where the
indictment alleges the burglary of a dwelling. Thus, the defendant
179. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 488, 492, 393 S.E.2d 425, 427-28 (1990). How-
ever, in this case the conviction for driving after having been declared a habitual offender
was reversed. The prisoner's guardian ad litem had failed to discuss with the defendant the
habitual offender petition which had been brought against him, and failed also to investi-
gate thoroughly the underlying facts. Because the defendant was denied due process in the
underlying adjudication, the order was void. Id. at 495-96, 393 S.E.2d at 429.
180. Steed v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 175, 179, 397 S.E.2d 281, 284 (1990). The court
of appeals distinguished Bibb v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 249, 183 S.E.2d 732 (1971), be-
cause the statute in that case stated that notice given according to the provisions of the
statute constituted only prima facie evidence of valid service of process; whereas the statute
in this case "expressly states that compliance is sufficient to constitute valid service." Steed,
11 Va. App. at 179, 397 S.E.2d at 284.
181. Thomas v. City of Norfolk, 207 Va. 12, 14, 147 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1966).
182. Myatt v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App 163, 166, 397 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1990).
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-104(b) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
184. Snead v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 643, 648, 400 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1991). The en-
hancement applies only to prior shoplifting-type offenses. Scott v. Commonwealth, 217 Va.
425, 427, 230 S.E.2d 236, 237 (1976).
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in such a case is not entitled to an instruction permitting a verdict
of guilty to the less serious offense. 8 5 The court of appeals has also'
held that an alley, under certain circumstances, may not be in-
tended for public use, and thus may be an area the use of which
may permit prosecution for trespassing under section 18.2-119 of
the Code.18
F. Rape
In Maynard v. Commonwealth,8 7 the defendant broke into the
victim's house and assaulted her during a two hour period. Later
that morning, she discovered money missing from her wallet. The
defendant was convicted of breaking and entering with the intent
to commit larceny. This conviction was reversed, as the evidence
did not exclude the possibility that someone other than the in-
truder took the money.188
In Myers v. Commonwealth,'89 the court of appeals affirmed a
conviction of rape and held that the evidence was sufficient to
show force, threat, or intimidation even though there was no
weapon or threat of physical harm. The victim testified to a sub-
jective fear of the defendant and a fear of having to walk back
through the woods, the alternative the defendant had presented
her.190
G. Bigamy
A reasonable belief that one is divorced is not a defense to
bigamy. 19'1
X. CONCLUSION
The greatest value of this year's appellate decisions, as in previ-
ous years, lies in their publication-that is the numerous rulings
establishing case law on commonly-encountered issues. At times,
the intermediate court has ruled more conservatively than popu-
larly imagined in the past, and in a few decisions, the court's rea-
185. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 649, 400 S.E.2d 794 (1991).
186. Miller v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 472, 475, 393 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1990).
187. 11 Va. App. 437, 440, 399 S.E.2d 635, 637 (1990).
188. Id. at 452-t3, 399 S.E.2d at 644.
189. 11 Va. App. 634, 636-37, 400 S.E.2d 803, 805-06 (1991).
190. Id.
191. Stuart v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 216, 217, 397 S.E.2d 533, 533 (1991).
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soning seems a bit strained. Some observers comment on the irony
of the defense bar's increasing reliance on the Supreme Court of
Virginia to reverse the court of appeals. In some instances, the su-
preme court has fulfilled the function as a court of last resort, even
for the defense. For the most part, however, the court of appeals
remains, in realistic terms, the sole appellate court for criminal ap-
peals. In this practical sense, and in the court's continuing resolu-
tion of procedural and discretionary issues historically and exclu-
sively decided on a case by case basis by the trial courts, the court
of appeals has assumed a dominant role in the criminal justice sys-
tem. This is evident in that it has published case law where before
there was none, and has established uniformity on common ques-
tions of sufficiency, practice and procedure. This role has been
both valuable and welcome.

